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On the Dynamics of Interstate Migration: 
Migration Costs and Self-Selection
*
 
This paper develops a tractable dynamic microeconomic model of migration decisions that is 
aggregated to describe the behavior of interregional migration. Our structural approach 
allows us to deal with dynamic self-selection problems that arise from the endogeneity of 
location choice and the persistency of migration incentives. Keeping track of the distribution 
of migration incentives over time has important consequences for the econometrical 
treatment, because the dynamics of this distribution influences the estimation of structural 
parameters, such as migration costs. For US interstate migration, we obtain a cost estimate 
of less than one-half of an average annual household income. This is substantially smaller 
than the migration costs estimated by previous studies. We attribute this difference to the 
treatment of the dynamic self-selection problem. 
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US federal states". 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Migration decisions are important economic decisions. Migration allows individual agents
to evade adverse shocks to their income and it is an important way of macroeconomic
adjustment (Blanchard and Katz, 1992, and Decressin and Fatas, 1995). Many factors
inﬂuence the decision to migrate and there is a vast empirical literature that links migra-
tion decisions to economic incentives (see Greenwood, 1975, 1985, and 1997 and Cushing
and Poot, 2004 for survey articles). At the same time, most of this literature has re-
mained relatively silent about the actual costs of migration to individual agents. Albeit,
migration costs are a structural parameter of high interest, both at an individual level as
well as from an aggregate perspective (Sjaastad, 1962), for example since more generous
unemployment insurance schemes will receive more political support in countries where
migration costs are high, see Hassler et al. (2005).
While the literature has in general remained silent about migration costs, a small
number of recent studies does report estimates, despite their estimation being technically
demanding. For example, Davies, Greenwood, and Li (2001) report a cost estimate of
about US$ 180,000 for each migration between US states, and Kennan and Walker (2003,
2006) conclude that, for a typical move, migration costs are between US$ 176,000 and
US$ 270,000.1 This magnitude of migration costs corresponds to roughly 4-6 average
annual household incomes. Such an estimate appears very high.
Kennan and Walker (2003) suggest that some kind of omitted variable problem may
drive the high cost estimate. In particular, they suggest that an unobservable wage
component is correlated to the decision to stay. We argue that the endogeneity of the
location choice will always lead to such correlation between unobserved idiosyncratic
wage components and location. This endogeneity problem, put in simple words, refers
to the fact that agents are in a certain region most likely because they moved there in
the past for the reason that they are better oﬀ living there. If all observable things are
equal, it must be some unobserved component of their preferences that is in favor of the
place in which they actually live.
These considerations motivate us to develop a microeconomic structural model of
migration which can be aggregated and used to describe the simultaneous evolution
of unobservable migration incentives and migration rates at an aggregate level. Our
modelling strategy follows Caballero and Engel’s (1999) paper on investment, which
highlights the interaction of lumpy investment and the evolution of investment incentives.
1These estimates do not yet include mark-ups for distance and other factors that inﬂuence the psychic
costs of migration. Return migration is usually associated with lower, but still substantial costs.
2For migration, the evolution of incentives is driven by income shocks and past mi-
gration. Say a household living in one region is earning a low current income, but
faces a substantially higher potential income in an other region. This household is very
likely to migrate. As a result, the number of households facing large income diﬀeren-
tials strongly decreases after migration decisions have been taken, while the number of
households facing a smaller income diﬀerential changes less. Unless income diﬀerentials
are fully observable, the resulting distribution of unobserved migration incentives will
be endogenous. In particular, it will take a non-standard, unknown form, it will not
be symmetric, and it will change over time. Only making explicit this simultaneous
evolution in a simulation approach allows us to avoid the problem of unobservability of
incentives.
While we can use our structural model to do so, i.e. to express and to track the
dynamic evolution of migration incentives at the macroeconomic level, we are constrained
to a bi-regional setup for numerical feasibility. This constraint arises because simulating
the dynamic evolution of migration incentives is numerically intense. For the same
reason, we have to focus exclusively on the migration-income relation, excluding other
factors that may be important to migration decisions and shape the heterogeneity of
the population in terms of their migration behavior.2 Nonetheless, our focus allows
us to analyze the importance of the aforementioned dynamic self-selection problem in
modelling and analyzing migration behavior. Migration costs are found to be about US$
18,500, less than one-half of an average annual household income. This cost estimate is
substantially lower than the cost estimates reported by previous studies. Moreover, we
show that applying the techniques used in other papers, we would obtain higher cost
estimates also from data generated by a simulation of our structural model.
Not only that we estimate substantially lower migration costs when taking into ac-
count dynamic self-selection, but we also document a migration dynamics at the micro
level that diﬀers from a model which does not keep track of the incentive distribution.
For example, agents who have recently migrated are more likely to migrate again over
the next years in our model, a fact which has frequently been documented by studies
using micro data (e.g. Kennan and Walker, 2006). In our model, this eﬀect is only due
to the incentive dynamics, but not because there is any fundamental "mover-stayer" het-
erogeneity. Taking into account dynamic self-selection, our approach hence complements
the structural approaches of Davies, Greenwood, and Li (2001) and Kennan and Walker
(2006), who neglect self-selection but account for a richer set of factors that inﬂuence
2This research strategy links our paper to Coen-Pirani’s (2006) island-economy model of regional
migration.
3migration decisions.3
Overall, we conclude that keeping track of the distribution of migration incentives
over time has an important inﬂuence on the estimation of migration costs. This ﬁnding
extends the role of self-selection problems to a dynamic setup, which so far have been
highlighted in static frameworks (see for example Borjas, 1987, Borjas, Bronars, and
Trejo, 1992, Tunali, 2000, and Hunt and Mueller, 2004).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a brief discussion
of the diﬃculties of estimating structural migration models when the population dynam-
ically self-selects into its preferred region. The section develops the main motive of our
paper and illustrates why migration costs are hard to estimate by standard (discrete
choice) estimation techniques. Motivated by these considerations, Section 3 presents a
dynamic microeconomic model of the migration decision which assumes that an agent
maximizes future expected well-being by location choice. In Section 4, we show how to
aggregate this model. We derive the contemporaneous law of motion of the distribution
of migration incentives and aggregate migration rates. Section 5 confronts the model
with aggregate data on migration between US states and presents the estimates of the
structural parameters of the model, in particular the estimates of migration costs. Sec-
tion 6 investigates in more detail the role of self-selection for our estimation, both for the
biases in static estimation and for the micro structure of migration. Section 7 concludes
and an appendix provides detailed proofs as well as details on the data employed.
2 What makes migration costs so hard to measure?
Most micro studies and now also more macro studies on migration link the individual
migration decision to a probabilistic model in which agent i migrates at time t if the







= γxit + νit, (1)
is large enough and exceeds some threshold value ¯ c, see for example Davies, Greenwood,
and Li (2001), Hunt and Mueller (2004), or Kennan and Walker (2006). This threshold
value ¯ c can be interpreted as migration costs in utility terms. The vector of covariates xit
is composed of information that describes economic incentives to migrate, i.e. the gains
from migration. The vector of parameters γ measures the sensitivity of the migration
3Kennan and Walker’s (2006) as well as our model are based on the real-options approach to migration
suggested by Burda (1993) and Burda et al. (1998). However, the latter two papers only look at migration
as a once and for all decision, so that they preclude return migration. Moreover, they do not study the
evolution of migration incentives, to which past migration decisions feed back.
4decision to these economic incentives. The stochastic component νit reﬂects diﬀerences
across agents, omitted migration incentives, and/or some variability of migration costs.
Typically, we are interested in the structural parameters γ and ¯ c and hence would es-
timate some version of (1) to infer these parameters. Unfortunately, such direct approach
is very diﬃcult as potential migration gains are unobservable to the econometrician.
To illustrate this diﬃculty, suppose that an agent only cares about the diﬀerence in
income between home and destination region, regions A and B in the following. In such
setting, xit would be simply a measure of relative income potentials for an agent which
she can realize by location choice. A rational agent then moves to the region where she
earns the most, provided that her migration costs are covered by the discounted present
value of the diﬀerences in future incomes.
However, the econometrician can only observe the income that an agent realizes
in the region in which she is currently living. Therefore, the other, the unobserved,
potential income has to be proxied. Typically, it is proxied by an income a similar agent
realizes in the other region. One example for this approach is the paper by Hunt and
Mueller (2004), which applies Mincer-type wage regressions to obtain the unobservable
potential income. A similar example can be found in Burda et al. (1998) or Kennan
and Walker (2006). At a macro level, this approach often means replacing agent-speciﬁc
income diﬀerences by average income diﬀerences across regions, see for example Davies,
Greenwood, and Li (2001).
If we proxy the unobservable income diﬀerence xit for individual i in equation (1) by







= γ¯ x.t + γ (xit − ¯ x.t)+νit | {z }
composed error term
. (2)
The composed error term γ (xit − ¯ x.t)+νit now also includes the idiosyncratic component
of income diﬀerences ηit := (xit − ¯ x.t). In a microeconomic interpretation of (2), ¯ x.t is
the income component that is explained by all observable characteristics of the agent in
a Mincer-type wage regression and ηit is the unexplained residual. Our argument applies
to this microeconomic interpretation too.
Since we do not want to base our argument on a classical measurement error or omit-
ted variable problem, assume that the idiosyncratic component to the income diﬀerence
ηit is orthogonal to the average income diﬀerence ¯ x.t. For the ease of exposition, sup-
pose in addition that the agent really just cares about income, so that the true stochastic
component is actually identical to zero, νit ≡ 0.







= γ¯ x.t + γηit. (3)
In this equation, the regression residual only captures the distribution of idiosyncratic
potential income diﬀerences around the mean.
While the migration decision is deterministic to the individual in this setting, it is
stochastic to the econometrician due to his lack of knowledge of ηit. If the econometrician
were to know the distribution of the unobserved component ηit, he would nonetheless
be able to estimate γ with a suitable probabilistic discrete choice model. However, it is
problematic to assume one of the standard distributions for ηit, e.g. a probit distribution.
Suppose agents are heterogeneous with respect to their potential incomes, so that the
idiosyncratic component ηit has a non-degenerated distribution. In particular, assume
that ηit is initially normally distributed as displayed in Figure 1 (a), so that in the initial
situation a probit model would be appropriate. The ﬁgure displays the distribution of
migration incentives, i.e. potential incomes, xit =¯ x.t + ηit. Low values of this sum
imply that income in region A is favorable, high values of this sum imply better income
prospects in region B. Correspondingly, all agents with ¯ x.t + ηit < 0 decide to live in
region A a n dt h e yd e c i d et ol i v ei nr e g i o nB otherwise if we assume zero migration costs
for the moment. In other words, agents self-select into the region that is favorable for
them.4
As a result of this self-selection, the distribution of income diﬀerences changes for
the next period. No agent who lives in region A prefers to live in region B. This means
that for those agents who live in region A the distribution of income diﬀerences is as
displayed in Figure 1 (b). Eﬀectively, the right-hand part of the distribution in Figure 1
(a) has been cut because all agents with higher income in region B have actually chosen
B as the region to live in.
It can be seen that migration incentives ¯ x.t + ηit are no longer normally distributed
conditional on a household living in region A. Since the estimation residual γηit in our
setup results from a linear transformation of the migration incentive ¯ x.t + ηit, also the
estimation residual γηit is no longer normally distributed. Accordingly, the distributional
assumptions to estimate (1) by standard maximum likelihood techniques are no longer
fulﬁlled.
Even adding a normally distributed idiosyncratic income shock does not reestablish a
4This self-selection is driven directly by the heterogeneity of agents with respect to potential incomes,
but it does not reﬂect immanent and ﬁxed diﬀerences of the regions as in Borjas (1987) and Borjas,
Bronars, and Trejo (1992).
6Figure 1: Distribution of potential incomes in region B relative to A
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7normal distribution of income diﬀerences if income diﬀerences are suﬃciently persistent.
Figure 1 (c) displays how mild idiosyncratic shocks alter the distribution displayed in
Figure 1 (b). Again, the distribution is diﬀerent from the standard distributions assumed
in the estimation of discrete-choice models. The colored-in region indicates the set of
agents that will migrate from A to B after the idiosyncratic shocks.
Besides idiosyncratic shocks, also aggregate shocks to the average income diﬀerence
¯ x.t inﬂuence the migration decisions of agents. Figure 1 (d) shows the distribution of
migration incentives as in Figure 1 (c), but after an adverse shock to region A. By
comparing Figures 1 (c) and 1 (d), one can see that the shape of the distribution after
migration (the not colored-in region) diﬀers between both ﬁgures. In consequence, the
distribution of migration incentives will not be strictly stationary, it will evolve over
time, and it will depend on the history of aggregate shocks.
Now, how does this correspond to an unreasonable estimate of migration costs?
If the parameter ¯ c in (1) is normalized to 1, the parameter γ has a straightforward
interpretation. It measures the sensitivity of migration decisions to income incentives
and its inverse 1
γ is exactly the income diﬀerential at which an average agent is just
indiﬀerent between moving and not moving. Or to put it diﬀerently, ¯ c
γ is the money
measure of average migration costs.
In turn, this implies that any bias in the estimate of ¯ c or γ directly translates into a
bias in estimated migration costs ¯ c
γ. With the distribution of migration incentives mis-
speciﬁed, ¯ c and/or γ will be estimated with a bias most probably. The mis-speciﬁcation
of the distribution of migration incentives has two aspects. One is that the distribution
will always be non-standard, i.e. neither normal nor logistic. The second aspect is that
the distribution also changes over time as a result of aggregate shocks to income and
the triggered migration decisions. Accordingly, one needs to keep track of the evolution
of the incentive distribution and standard techniques to deal with self-selection cannot
b ea p p l i e di nas t r a i g h t f o r w a r dw a y .T h e r e f o r e ,w ed e v e l o pam o d e lb a s e do nd y n a m i c
optimal migration decisions in the presence of persistent shocks to income. This model
can then be aggregated and used to simulate the evolution of migration and its incentives
over time.
3 A simple stochastic model of migration decisions
We consider an economy with two regions, A and B. This economy is assumed to be
inhabited by a continuum of inﬁnitely lived agents of measure 1. We model the economy
in discrete time and at each point in time an agent has to decide in which region to
live and work. First, we consider the decision problem of an individual agent i living in
8region j = A,B. Thereafter we discuss aggregation and the dynamics of the distribution
of migration incentives.
Living in region j at time t gives the agent utility ˜ wijt. Although ˜ wijt could be
understood as a catch-all variable for migration incentives, which can be interpreted as
wage income, employment prospects, amenities, utility from social networks and so on,
we restrict ourselves to an interpretation of ˜ wijt as income.
Migration incentives (incomes) are stochastic in our model. We assume them to be
composed of a permanent (autocorrelated) component ˜ wijt and a transitory (i.i.d.) com-
ponent ϕijt.5 These components vary over time and across individuals. For simplicity,
we assume that only the permanent component is observed before the migration decision.
Consequently, in describing migration behavior, we can focus exclusively on the eﬀect of
permanent variations in potential incomes. Changes in the transitory component realize
after migration and hence do not aﬀect migration choice. However, when confronting our
model to data, including data on aggregate income, we need to take transitory income
ﬂuctuations into account. This means that the microeconomic model does not need to
include the transitory income component, while we have to take it into account in the
aggregation of realized incomes.
Moving from one region to the other is not costless to an agent. When an agent
moves, she is subject to a disutility c that enters additively in her utility function.
Therefore, the instantaneous utility function uit(j,k) is given by
uit (j,k)= ˜ wijt − Ij6=kc (4)
for an agent that has lived in region k in the preceding period and now lives in region j.
Here, I denotes an indicator function, which equals 1 if the agent has moved from region
k to j and 0 if the agent already lived in region j before.
The agent discounts future utility by factor β<1 and maximizes the discounted sum
of expected future utility by location choice. The agent knows the distribution of the
permanent component of income ˜ wijt and forms rational expectations. With ˜ wijt being
stochastic, the potential migrant waits for good income opportunities. In her migration
decision the agent thus takes into account the option value to wait and learn more about
future incomes.
The distribution of migration incentives, ˜ wijt, is assumed to be log-normal. In partic-
ular, we assume that log income, wijt, follows an AR(1) process with normally distributed
5See the evidence on transitory income ﬂuctuations provided by Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron
(2004) for instance.
9innovations ξijt and autoregressive coeﬃcient ρ :
ln( ˜ wijt)= :wijt = μj (1 − ρ)+ρwijt−1 + ξijt,j= A,B. (5)
This process holds for the whole continuum of agents and each agent draws her own series
of innovations ξijt for both regions. The expected value of log income in region j is μj.
The innovations ξijt are composed of aggregate as well as idiosyncratic components.
They have mean zero, are serially uncorrelated, but may be correlated across regions
A,B (see Section 4.2.2).6
Income and cost distributions, together with the utility function and the discount
factor deﬁne the decision problem for the potential migrant. This is an optimization
problem, which is described by the following Bellman equation:
V (k,wiAt,w iBt)= m a x
j=A,B
©
exp(wijt) − I{k6=j}c + βEtV (j,wiAt+1,w iBt+1)
ª
. (6)
In this equation, Et denotes the expectations operator with respect to information avail-
able at time t.7
The optimal policy is relatively simple. The agent migrates from region k to region j
if and only if the costs of migration are lower than the sum of direct beneﬁts of migration
expwijt − expwikt and the expected value gain
∆V (wiAt,w iBt): =βEt [V (B,wiAt+1,w iBt+1) − V (A,wiAt+1,w iBt+1)]. (7)
This means that the agent migrates if and only if
c ≤ exp(wijt) − exp(wikt)+∆V (wiAt,w iBt)= :¯ c(wA,w B). (8)
This gives a critical level of costs ¯ c(wA,w B) at which an agent living in region A is
indiﬀerent between moving and not moving to region B. A person moves from A to B if
a n do n l yi f
c ≤ ¯ cA := ¯ c(wA,w B).
C o n v e r s e l y ,ap e r s o nl i v i n gi nr e g i o nB moves to region A i fa n do n l yi f
c ≤ ¯ cB := −¯ c(wA,w B).
6For technical reasons, we assume boundedness of ξijt, so that ξijt is in fact only approximately
normal.
7Existence and uniqueness of the value function is proved in the appendix.
10Note that ¯ c can be positive as well as negative. If ¯ c is positive, region B is more attractive.
If it is negative, region A i sm o r ea t t r a c t i v ea n dap e r s o nl i v i n gi nr e g i o nAw o u l do n l y
have an incentive to move to region B if migration costs were negative.
4 Aggregate migration and the dynamics of income distributions
4.1 Aggregate migration
Given this trigger rationale for migration, the hazard rate
Λj (wA,w B): =
(
1if c ≤ ¯ cj (wA,w B)
0 otherwise
, j = A,B
deﬁnes whether a person in region j moves to the other region if she faces the potential
incomes (wA,w B).
Now, consider the distribution Ft of (potential) incomes (wA,w B) and household
locations. Suppose this joint income and location distribution is the distribution after
t h ei n c o m es h o c k sξijt have been realized, but before migration decisions have been
taken. Let fjt denote the conditional density of this distribution, conditional on the
household living in region j at time t. Then, the actual fraction ¯ Λjt of households living
in j that migrate to the other region evaluates as
¯ Λjt :=
Z
Λj (wA,w B) · fjt(wA,w B)dwAdwB. (9)
The aggregate migration hazard can be thought of as a weighted mean of all microeco-
nomic migration hazards Λj (wA,w B), weighted by the density of income pairs (wA,w B)
from distribution Ft.
4.2 Dynamics of income distributions
The distribution Ft itself (and hence fjt) evolves over time and is a result of direct
shocks to income just as it is a result of past migration. We need to characterize the law
of motion for Ft to close our model and to obtain the sequence of aggregate migration
rates.
4.2.1 The eﬀect of migration on income distributions
In order to follow the evolution of Ft we need to characterize both the evolution of
the fraction Pjt of households living in each region and the conditional distribution of
incomes fjt (conditional on a household actually living in a speciﬁcr e g i o nj).
The proportion of households living in region j at time t+1is a result of migration
11decisions at time t. The law of motion for Pjt is thus given by
Pjt+1 =
¡
1 − ¯ Λjt
¢
Pjt + ¯ Λ−jtP−jt. (10)
The ﬁrst part of the sum reﬂects the fraction of households that remain in region j,
where
¡
1 − ¯ Λjt
¢
is the probability to stay in region j. The second part is the fraction of
households that migrate from region −j to region j.
Since the microeconomic migration hazard depends on (wA,w B), diﬀerent potential
incomes result in diﬀerent propensities to migrate. In consequence, migration changes
not only the fraction Pjt of households living in region j at time t, but also the conditional
distribution of income, fjt. For example, households living in region A, e a r n i n gal o w
current income, wA, but facing a substantially higher potential income in B, wB, will
probably migrate. As a result, the number of those households will drop to zero in region
A after migration decisions have been taken, while the number of households facing a
smaller income diﬀerential might not change, recall Figure 1.
The distribution of migration incentives is thus a function of past migration decisions,
and we can express the new density of households with income (wA,w B) in region j after
migration, ˆ fjt, by
ˆ fjt(wA,w B)=[ 1− Λjt(wA,w B)]
fjt(wA,wB)Pjt
Pjt+1 + Λ−jt(wA,w B)
f−jt(wA,wB)P−jt
Pjt+1 . (11)
The probability [1 − Λjt(wA,w B)] is again the probability to stay in region j.T h e
term fjt(wA,w B)Pjt weights this probability and is the unconditional income density
for region j before migration has taken place. To obtain the conditional density after
migration, the unconditional income density, fjt(wA,w B)Pjt, is divided by Pjt+1, which
is the fraction (or probability) of households living in region j after migration (i.e. in
time t +1 ) . Analogously, the second part of the sum is constructed.
4.2.2 The eﬀect of income shocks on the income distribution
Besides migration, also shocks to income change the distribution of income pairs, Ft.
The shocks to income can be diﬀerentiated along two dimensions: One dimension is
aggregate vs. idiosyncratic, the other one is region-speciﬁc vs. economy-wide. For a
single agent we can decompose the total shock ξijt to her potential income in region
j (see equation 5) into an aggregate regional-component θjt and an individual-speciﬁc
12regional-component ωijt : 8
wijt =μj (1 − ρ)+ρwijt−1 + ξijt
ξijt =θjt + ωijt,j = A,B.
The aggregate shock θjt for region j hits all agents equally and changes their potential
income for region j. Note that this shock does not depend on the actual region the agent
is living in. For example, a positive shock θAt > 0 increases the potential income in
region A for agents that are currently living in this region as well as for agents that are
currently living in region B. They realize this potential income by deciding to actually
live in region A. The importance of economy-wide business cycles relative to the size of
region-speciﬁc aggregate ﬂuctuations is reﬂected by the correlation ψθ between aggregate
shocks θAt and θBt.
Such aggregate shocks are typically only a minor source of income variation for an
agent, though. Agents diﬀer in various personal characteristics that result in diﬀerent
income proﬁles over time. Individuals diﬀer in their skills and while the demand may
grow for the skill of one person, demand may deteriorate for another person’s skills.
This heterogeneity is captured by the idiosyncratic shocks (ωiAt,ωiBt). If ωiAt is pos-
itive, income prospects of the individual agent i increase in region A. The correlation
ψω between ωiAt and ωiBt reﬂects economy-wide demand shifts for a person’s individual
skills. Since we assume aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks to be independent, the vari-





Persistency in incomes is captured by the autoregressive parameter ρ in equation (5).
We abstain from the inclusion of permanently ﬁxed individual diﬀerences (ﬁxed eﬀects)
primarily because this makes the model numerically more tractable.9
Together, aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks to income as well as income persistency
determine the transition from ˆ fjt to fjt+1, details are provided in the appendix. The
latter density now determines migration decisions in time t +1 , starting the cycle over
8Note that this is equivalent to assuming that both aggregate and idiosyncratic (deviations from
aggregate) potential incomes follow AR-1 processes with the same autocorrelation ρ to which θ and ω
are the respective innovations.
9While the solution of the restricted dynamic programming problem of the agent can be obtained
quickly, the simulation of the distribution of migration incentives is numerically much more involved.
The compuatation time for the estimation amounts to ca. 24h on a Xeon 3GHz machine.
If we were to include ﬁxed eﬀects that reﬂect diﬀerent types of agents, the model had to be solved for
each diﬀerent type of agent in the way it is now solved for the single type of agent. Thus, any modelling
of k heterogeneous types of migrants would mean an time need of k days for the estimation.
13again. As a result it is both past income shocks and past migration decisions that drive
the incentives to migrate. Making this explicit and keeping track of the distributional
dynamics of migration incentives is the key element of our model, as it distinguishes our
approach from other empirical models of migration.
4.3 Aggregate Income
To link our model to aggregate data, we ﬁnally need to describe the evolution of aggregate
regional realized incomes. For region j, the fraction of income which is persistent and
realized after migration reads as the conditional expected value of exp(wijt)
Z
exp(wj) ˆ fjt(wA,w B)dwAdwB.
Besides persistent income also transitory components (orthogonal to the persistent part)
add to the ﬂuctuations of income in observed data, so that we obtain for log aggregate
income ¯ wjt
¯ wjt =l n
µZ
exp(wj) ˆ fjt(wA,w B)dwAdwB
¶
+ ϕjt.
The transitory income component ϕjt measures ﬂuctuations in income at a high fre-
quency that are irrelevant to the migration decision. More generally, it captures in the
empirical approach the idea that in reality income measures migration incentives im-
perfectly. One reason is that the empirical income concept is noisy as such. Personal
income–the income concept we use–comprises labor income as well as some compo-
nents of capital incomes. Whether each of these elements is too widely or too narrowly




We rely on an indirect inference procedure in order to ﬁnd the parameters of our model
that allow us to match closest the observed patterns of migration that are in the data.
In particular, we apply a method of simulated moments (MSM) as has been proposed by
Gourieroux, Monfort, and Renault (1993) to obtain estimates of structural parameters
when the likelihood function of the structural model becomes intractable, as in our
setting. This estimator relies on numerical simulation of the model, details on the
numerical simulation are provided in the appendix.
The idea behind indirect inference is to choose a set of moments that captures the
14characteristics of the data, and then to calibrate and simulate the structural economic
model such that the moments are best replicated by the simulation. Accordingly, we
have to 1) discuss how to use our model of two regions to address migration between
a richer set or regions, 2) decide which parameters of our model shall be estimated
and which are treated as ﬁx, 3) decide on an informative set of moments along which
simulated and real-world data are compared, and 4) decide how to measure the closeness
of the simulated and actual moments.
A simulation of our model yields migration and income data for two regions. Of
course, the actual migrant faces a more complex decision problem than the one simulated
in our model of two regions. Including D.C. as a destination region, an agent has to
decide between 50 possible alternatives states where she can move to. To make this
comparable to our model, the 50 alternatives in the data have to be aggregated to a
single complementary region.10 The average income of the alternative region is proxied
by the population-weighted average income over all alternative 50 states.11 With these
assumptions, we can use our model to simulate a dataset for migration that has the
same size as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) migration data, which is our empirical
benchmark. This database contains annual area-to-area migration ﬂow data for US
states for the period 1989-2004.12 Accordingly, we simulate our model for 51 pairs of
regions and 81 years, but we drop the ﬁrst 55 years for each region to minimize the
inﬂuence of our initial choice of F0. In order to minimize simulation uncertainty, we
replicate each simulation 5 times and use the averages over the simulations.
Naturally, we cannot estimate all parameters of the model, since this would be nu-
merically infeasible since every dimension added to the parameter search increases the
estimation time exponentially. Our primary interest is to estimate migration costs. Be-
sides migration costs, we restrict ourselves to the estimation of those parameters of
our model which cannot be inferred from raw data alone. One such set of estimated
10Generating artiﬁcial bi-regional data means that we assume technically that the best income oppor-
tunity over all alternative regions follows the log-normal distribution assumed in our model. Note that
an approximation of this sort cannot be avoided by assuming an extreme value distribution for incomes.
This would only work if migration incentives were serially uncorrelated.
11Income data is taken from the REIS database, CPI deﬂated, and in logs.
12A detailed data description of both IRS and REIS data can found in the data appendix. Alternative
migration data for the US, such as the Census, are less appropriate for our analysis as we focus on the
eﬀect of income dynamics. While the Census reports changes in the place of residence over a period
of 5 years and is only available once every decade, the IRS data are available on a yearly basis. The
Census data suggests an approximate annual migration rate of 2%, which is signiﬁcantly lower than the
m i g r a t i o nr a t eo f3 . 9 %d o c u m e n t e di nt h eI R Sd a t a . T h i sd i ﬀerence may stem from the fact that the
Census data cannot take into account return migration over a 5 year period, which can be expected to
be of sizable importance (see the discussion in Coen-Pirani, 2006 or the results of Kennan and Walker,
2006).
15parameters is the correlation of shocks to permanent income across regions, ψω and
ψθ. Another is the correlation of income shocks across individuals, i.e. the fraction of
aggregate shocks, φ. These correlations refer to potential incomes and are therefore in-
herently unobservable. We assume that aggregate and individual correlation coeﬃcients
are equal, i.e. ψω = ψθ, so that we only need to estimate one common parameter, ψ.
Since migration smooths income, the counterparts to φ and ψ in terms of a covariance
structure in realized incomes are substantially inﬂuenced by the magnitude of migration
costs. At the same time, we also expect φ and ψ to have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the
behavior of aggregate migration itself. Consequently, we can neither estimate them from
raw realized income data, nor ﬁx them to arbitrary values.
The transitory shock is irrelevant to the migration decision, and hence its eﬀect on
realized incomes cannot be smoothed by migration. For this reason, we ﬁx the correlation
of the transitory income shock, ψϕ, to the value of the observed correlation of incomes
in the REIS data, taking ﬁxed eﬀects and a linear time trend into account. However,
the variance of the transitory shock, σ2
ϕ, is estimated. The transitory component does
not only capture purely transitory ﬂuctuations in income, but also various forms of
measurement error. Since we ﬁnd it diﬃcult to guess their quantitative importance, we
abstain from ﬁxing its variance or estimating it outside the model. Our complete set of











in our model have to be ﬁxed to take
reasonable values. As we work with annual data, we choose the discount factor β =0 .95.
In order to characterize the process for income, we need to specify the autocorrelation
parameter ρ,t h em e a nμ, and the long-run variance of income. We take these parameters
from the recent paper by Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004). They estimate the
dynamics of idiosyncratic labor market risk for the US based on the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics. Thus the paper conveys information on both income variances and
autocorrelation of log household income. Besides, the paper reports a mean household
income of US$ 45,000. To approximately match this ﬁgure, we choose the mean of the log
income to be μA = μB =1 0 .5. Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) ﬁnd an annual
autocorrelation of incomes of roughly 0.95 and a standard deviation of idiosyncratic
income shocks ranging from 0.09 to 0.14 for business cycle expansions and from 0.16 to
0.25 for business cycle contractions (see Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron 2004, Table 2).
They report a frequency weighted average of 0.17 for those standard deviations in their
preferred speciﬁcation (Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron, 2004, pp. 711). Since we do not
model diﬀerent variances of idiosyncratic shocks to income along the business cycle, we
use their preferred average value of 0.17 for the estimation. Combining both elements,
16the autocorrelation and the variance of idiosyncratic shocks to income, we calculate the




A next step is to decide on an informative set of moments,  . We select the standard
deviation of migration rates, the standard deviation of average incomes, and the corre-
lation of average incomes across regions as the ﬁrst three moments to be matched. To
this set of moments we add the estimated parameters from a reduced form regression of
migration rates on the incomes of the destination and the source region. To make the
regression scale-invariant with respect to incomes, we use log-deviations from average
incomes as the income variables, i.e. we estimate
mit = α0 + α1 (wit − ¯ wi)+α2 (w−it − ¯ w−i)+uit.
The parameters α1 and α2 reﬂect income sensitivities of migration. The intercept α0
captures the average of migration rates.
We simulate our model for a given vector of model parameters Θ and calculate the
distance between the moments obtained from this simulation ˆ  (Θ) and the sample mo-
ments  S.W eu s et h ec o v a r i a n c em a t r i xo f S obtained by 10000 bootstrap replications
as a weighting matrix so that our distance and goodness-of-ﬁtm e a s u r ei s
L =(  S − ˆ  (Θ))
0 cov( S)
−1 ( S − ˆ  (Θ)).
The actual estimation is carried out by minimizing the distance measure L numeri-
cally by using a direct search algorithm.
5.2 Estimation results
Table 1 displays the point estimates of the matched moments calculated from the IRS
and REIS data and the corresponding moments obtained from the simulation of our
model with the estimated parameters. In particular the column "All Moments Matched"
refers to the estimation results from our baseline speciﬁcation. The last two columns
report robustness checks discussed in the next subsection. Overall our model is able to
replicate the observed moments closely. In fact, the χ2 (2)-distributed overidentiﬁcation
test reported at the bottom of the table does not reject our model.
13T h ec h o i c et oﬁx σ
2
ξ is somewhat problematic, but it arises as a necessary restriction from the
use of macro data. The realized ﬂuctuation of income is a function of migration costs. Still we use
statistics calculated from realized income ﬂuctuations to calibrate a parameter for potential income
ﬂuctuations. Yet, the standard deviation of idiosyncratic potential income can be understood as a
pure scaling parameter and even at zero migration costs, realized income inherits 89% of the standard
deviation of potential income. Consequently, at most we underestimate costs by 15% due to this.
17Table 1: Simulated moments estimation: moments estimates
Moment Actual Data Simulated Moments
Moments
All Moments w/o Average CRRA
Matched Migration Rate (log utility)
Migration Rates
standard deviation 0.0036 0.0038 0.0037 0.0033
Aggregate Regional Income
standard deviation 0.0299 0.0294 0.0298 0.0283
correlation across regions 0.5807 0.5714 0.5762 0.5686
Reduced Form Regression
intercept (∅ migration rate) 0.0393 0.0394 (0.0386)1 0.0383
sensitivity to income
of destination region 0.0603 0.0663 0.0633 0.0494
sensitivity to income
of source region -0.0624 -0.0627 -0.0598 -0.0504
Overidentiﬁcation test χ2(2) 3.3583 1.6522 56.90
p-value 0.1865 0.19869 0.000
1 Not matched; 2 O n l yo n ed e g r e eo ff r e e d o m .
The column ‘Actual Data Moments’ refers to the moments estimated from the combined
REIS/IRS data set, with data on 50 US states and D.C. over the period 1989-2004. The
columns ‘Simulated Moments’ refer to the moments estimated from the simulation of the model
using the parameters given in Table 2. Both actual and simulated data are within-transformed
and linearly de-trended. The simulations generate a panel of 51 region-pairs and a 81-year
history of migration and income data. The ﬁrst 55 years of simulated data are dropped in order
to minimize the inﬂuence of initial values. Each simulation is repeated 5 times and data
moments are compared to the average over the 5 replications of the simulation.
18Table 2: Simulated moments estimation: structural parameter estimates
Parameter All Moments w/o Average CRRA
Matched Migration Rate (log utility)
Migration Costs 18,2851 18,5711 0.47622
(2,211) (6756) (0.6863)
Correlation of Income Shocks 0.2482 0.2178 0.1286
Across Regions Ψ (0.1947) (0.2446) (0.1852)
Fraction of Income Shock 0.0041 0.0040 0.0035
due to Aggregate Fluctuations φ (0.0011) (0.0034) (0.0011)
Standard Deviation of 0.0266 0.0265 0.0262
Transitory Income Shock σϕ (0.0012) (0.0020) (0.0012)
1Migration cost estimate ˆ c in US$ terms. 2 exp(ˆ c) − 1 measures the relative income gain
necessary to oﬀset migration costs.
Standard errors in parenthesis. Estimation is carried out using the simulated moments
estimator by Gourieroux, Monfort, and Renault (1993), which chooses structural model
parameters by matching the moments from a simulated panel of regions with data moments as
displayed in Table 1. The simulations generate a panel of 51 region-pairs and a 81-year history
of migration and income data. The ﬁrst 55 years of simulated data are dropped in order to
minimize the inﬂuence of initial values. Each simulation is repeated 5 times and data moments
are compared to the average over the 5 replications of the simulation.
Table 2 presents the estimates of the model parameters. The estimated migration
costs are US$ 18,285. This is a substantially smaller number than the estimates reported
in previous contributions such as Davies, Greenwood, and Li (2001) or Kennan and
Walker (2006).
The estimated correlation of income shocks across regions is 24.82%. This is signif-
icantly smaller than the observed correlation of realized incomes (58.07%,s e eT a b l e1 ).
The realized incomes co-move more strongly than the shocks to income because mi-
gration ties together more closely the average incomes in both regions than they were
tied together without migration. This drives a wedge between the correlation of income
shocks and the correlation of average realized incomes, the latter being larger than the
19former.
The estimated fraction of income shocks that is aggregate amounts to 0.41%. To
put this number into perspective, we calculate the long-run variance of per capita state
income, accounting for a linear time trend and ﬁxed eﬀects, and set this number relative
to the variance of household incomes as reported by Storesletten et al. (2004). While
this benchmark ratio is with 0.6% somewhat larger, it also points towards aggregate
income shocks being very small compared to idiosyncratic ones.
There is a signiﬁcant transitory income component (measurement error) in the ag-
gregate income ﬂuctuations, which has an estimated standard deviation of 0.0266. This
means that transitory ﬂuctuations in aggregate income add a variance term that has
about 36.5% of the long-run variance of the sum of potential incomes and measurement
error. However, migration smooths realized income so that transitory shocks make up
82% of the aggregate variance in realized incomes (again the sum of persistent and tran-
sitory ﬂuctuations). As outlined before, the transitory income component of our model
relates to two sources: to truly transitory ﬂuctuations in incomes and to the fact that
income does not measure migration incentives perfectly.
5.3 Robustness checks
One might argue that our relatively low migration-cost estimate is driven by the fact
that we attribute all migration to be driven by the income incentive. Correspondingly,
the average migration rate our model should match had to be lower. The downside of
such an argument is that it would be hard to tell which was the right migration rate to
match. Therefore, taking an agnostic view on this point, we provide a robustness check
of our estimation results, excluding the average migration rate from the set of moments
our model is calibrated to. The estimation results are reported in the corresponding
columns of Tables 1 and 2. As one can see, the point estimate for migration costs
changes only slightly. Since we drop one moment condition, the standard errors of the
estimates increase.
As an additional robustness check, we replace the assumption of a risk-neutral agent
and assume constant relative risk aversion instead. Instead of linear utility from income,
we now assume logarithmic utility. While one can interpret the risk-neutrality assump-
tion as a short cut for modelling an agent who has access to perfect capital markets,
the assumption of logarithmic utility from income can be thought of as a model of re-
stricted capital market access. The respective last column of Tables 1 and 2 report the
corresponding estimation results. The estimated cost parameter c is no longer readily
interpretable as a US$ value, instead it reﬂects the relative income gain necessary to
20oﬀset the costs of migration. This means that the money measure of migration costs at
average income is obtained by multiplying exp(c)−1 with average income. Our estimate
of c =0 .4762 implies an estimated migration cost of US$ 32,738.
6 Behind the Scenes & Further Aspects
A simulation based estimation technique like a method of simulated moments is, by
construction, somewhat of a black box. Therefore, we try to shed some light on our
estimation results by running counterfactual simulations, by comparing the estimation
to static estimation techniques, and by investigating the properties of the individual
(micro) migration data our model generates.
6.1 Zero migration costs
We start with a simulation of the model with migration costs set to zero. In a situation in
which unobservable migration incentives are serially uncorrelated, i.e. drawn completely
anew every period, migration rates would be 50% on average in the absence of migration
costs. In such situation of zero costs and i.i.d. incentives, every period half of the
population in one region is better oﬀ living in the other one. By contrast, this is no
longer true if there is serial correlation of incentives. Agents self-select into the region
where they are better oﬀ, and only those agents that have been on the margin, on the
verge of moving, in the previous period are likely to migrate in the current period. To
illustrate this point we simulate our model for the counterfactual case of zero migration
costs, setting all other parameters to their estimated values. In Table 3 we report some
summary statistics for this experiment.
The most important result of this simulation experiment concerns the average mi-
gration rate. Only 10.2% of the population migrates each year even if migration costs
are zero. This shows why a dynamic view on migration incentives leads to much lower
estimates of migration costs.
Besides we see that in a world with costless migration, realized incomes are more
strongly correlated, they vary less and are signiﬁcantly higher (+23.7%) than without
any migration. Compared to the simulation results under the estimated migration costs
(log average income: 10.876, i.e. +22.6%), the increase is only mild, however. Only
moves that lead to small income gains are added by setting migration costs to zero.
6.2 Cost estimates from static models
The evidence from the zero cost speciﬁcation suggests that it is indeed the dynamic
nature of the problem, with agents sorting themselves into their preferred region, that
21Table 3: Simulation results: Zero Migration Costs
Moment Data Simulated Moment Data Simulated
Moment Moment Moment Moment
Migration rates Reduced form regression3
standard deviation 0.0036 0.0074 intercept
(∅ migration rate) 0.0393 0.1017
Income
sensitivity of migration
log average income1 10.654 10.887 to income of:
destination region 0.0603 0.0577
standard deviation 0.0299 0.0294
source region -0.0624 -0.0542
correlation across 0.5808 0.6390
regions2
1 Cross-sectional average income of a region; 2 Partial correlation controlling for a linear time
trend and ﬁxed eﬀect; 3 Coeﬃcients of a reduced form regression of migration rates on incomes






. Original data has been rescaled to have
this mean value after de-trending.
The zero cost speciﬁcation assumes one US$ of migration costs for numerical feasibility. We
simulate data on 51 region-pairs and a 81 year history of migration and income data. The ﬁrst
55 years of simulated data are dropped in order to minimize the inﬂuence of initial values. The
simulation is repeated 5 times. The table reports averages over the 5 repetitions.
22changes the estimation of migration costs substantially. To provide further evidence, we
run three alternative estimation experiments.
• First, we re-estimate our model, setting the autocorrelation of income to zero,
keeping ﬁxed the long term variation of income. This experiment tells us which
role it plays in our model and estimation to keep track of the distribution of
migration incentives.
• Second, we apply a static random utility model to data generated from a simulation
of our model using the previously estimated parameters. In this setup, we know
the exact size of migration costs by construction. Hence, we can obtain an idea
about the bias introduced by static modelling.
• Third, we estimate an approximate version of our model, where the dynamic self-
selection that shapes incentive distributions is ignored. In this experiment, we
replace the conditional density in (9) by its unconditional counterpart. If self-
selection played no role, this replacement was innocent. The former place of
residence was of no informational content for unobservable migration incentives
and conditional and unconditional distributions coincided. Hence we should ob-
tain similar estimation results as in our baseline estimation speciﬁcation, if self
selection was of no concern.
As we will see, all three versions that ignore the dynamic setup will lead to higher
estimated migration costs.
6.2.1 Estimation with zero autocorrelation
As ﬁrst experiment is to estimate the model from real data, but setting the autocorrela-
tion of income to zero. Eﬀectively this makes our model a static model, as the expected
value in the Bellman equation (6) becomes independent of the current state of migration
incentives. Table 4 reports the estimation results from this experiment. Migration cost
estimates are with US$ 57,713 substantially higher in this setting than in the setting with
autocorrelated income. Moreover, the model is no longer able to match the observed
data moments, so that the model speciﬁcation test now rejects our model. Compared to
the estimates reported in the literature, estimated migration costs are still on the low
side. However, two aspects need to be taken into account: First, with assumed zero au-
tocorrelation of gains from migration, the net present value of these gains is very limited.
In fact, the (naive) net-present value gain from a once and for all location decision is
23Table 4: Simulated moments estimation: Estimation results for zero autocorrelation
Parameter Risk-Neutrality, Risk-Neutrality,
No Autocorrelation Autocorr. = 0.95
Migration Costs 576251 18,2851
(3601) (2,211)
Correlation of Income Shocks 0.1494 0.2482
Across Regions Ψ (0.1349) (0.1947)
Fraction of Income Shock 0.0001 0.0041
due to Aggregate Fluctuations φ (0.0007) (0.0011)
Standard Deviation of 0.0283 0.0266
Transitory Income Shock σϕ (0.0017) (0.0012)
p-value, χ2 (2) overident. test 0.0000 0.1865
1Migration cost estimate ˆ c in US$ terms.
Standard errors in parenthesis. Estimation is carried out using the simulated moments
estimator by Gourieroux, Monfort, and Renault (1993), which chooses structural model
parameters by matching the moments from a simulated panel of regions. See Table 1 for
further details. The simulations generate a panel of 51 region-pairs and a 81-year history of
migration and income data. The ﬁrst 55 years of simulated data are dropped in order to
minimize the inﬂuence of initial values. Each simulation is repeated 5 times and data moments
are compared to the average over the 5 replications of the simulation.
about 10 times smaller with no autocorrelation than in our baseline speciﬁcation. Sec-
ond, we estimate substantial measurement error in the no-autocorrelation speciﬁcation,
which dampens the increase in estimated migration costs. Under zero autocorrelation,
the estimated measurement error is with a standard deviation of 0.0283 substantially
larger, making up 96% of the sum of the long-run variances of potential income and
measurement error..
6.2.2 Random static utility model
To corroborate our conclusion in an alternative way, we simulate our model to generate
a data set that comprises 51 pairs of regions and 16 years of data. The parameters
24of the model are ﬁxed to their estimated values reported in the column "All Moments
Matched" in Table 2. Then we estimate a static random utility model of migration from
this data.
In particular, we apply a conditional-probit approach similar to Davies, Greenwood,
and Li’s (2001) conditional logit model to describe the migration decision. Simplifying
Davies, Greenwood, and Li’s (2001) model and adapting it to our bi-regional framework
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where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of a normal distribution.
While Davies, Greenwood, and Li (2001) include a set of other variables to describe
the utility gains from location choice, our simulated model just allows for log income
as an explanatory variable. This means that the form of the likelihood function in (12)
assumes that utility is composed of an income component (with sensitivity γ>0)a n da
disutility from migration c>0. The estimated money measure of this disutility is ˆ c
ˆ γ.14
Since our argument is not based on the classical measurement error that we addition-
ally took into account in our estimation, i.e. migration incentives being only imperfectly
measured by income, we run two versions of the static random utility experiment. In
the ﬁrst version, we set all parameters to their estimated values except for the variance
of the measurement error, which is set to zero instead. In the second version, we also
include the measurement error into the estimation. This allows us to decompose the
total bias into two sources, classical measurement error and dynamic self-selection.
Throughout, the migration costs taken from our estimation are US$ 18,285. For the
version without measurement error the conditional-logit estimation suggests a cost of
US$ 40,576, a number that is substantially higher than the costs used in the simulation.
In comparison, ’true’ and estimated costs correspond to 0.3 and 0.77 average annual
incomes, respectively. This comparative exercise shows that the estimation of structural
parameters is likely to be subject to a bias if the unobserved dynamics of the distribution
of incentives is not taken into account. Adding measurement errors to the simulated
income data drives the cost estimate up to US$ 99,457. These numbers suggest that
while the bias from self-selection is not exactly as important as the bias from classical
measurement error, still it is substantial.
14Since our model is composed of two regions only, we cannot estimate γ and c from a cross-section
as Davies, Greenwood, and Li (2001) do, but have to pool the simulated data instead.





Migration Cost (from estimation, used for simulation) 18,285 18,285
Average Annual Income 53,060 53,041
Migration Cost Estimate
Based on a Static Random Utility Model
- in terms of annual incomes 76.5% 187.4%
- in US $ 40,576 99,457
Figure 2 displays the cost estimates from the static random utility model as a function
of costs used in the simulation. There are two sources of bias linked to the static random
utility model in this setup. One is the dynamic self-selection bias we highlighted, the
other is a bias from misspeciﬁcation as the static model assumes no autocorrelation in
income diﬀerences. The latter bias stems from the fact that the static model considers
current incomes instead of net present values of income streams; it disregards future
income gains as a result of location choice.
We see that the bias from self-selection becomes more important, the lower the true
costs of migration are. If migration costs are very high, there is simply little migration
each year and hence not much self-selection. Instead, the mis-speciﬁcation (downwards)
bias of a static model dominates the bias from self-selection.
For comparison we plot static cost estimates from a simulation of our model with
autocorrelation ρ set to zero. In this setup the static random utility model is correctly
speciﬁed and leads to almost unbiased estimates if we assume income to be observed
before migration.15
15At very high costs the static random utility model ceases to estimate the costs used in the simulation
correctly, but this is most likely the case because the approximation quality of the income process becomes
weak in the then relevant domain of income ﬂuctuations. In fact, migration rates are already very low
when the static model ceases to estimate the cost parameter well, see Figure 2.
26Figure 2: Comparison of cost estimate based on a static random utility model
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276.2.3 Estimation with ﬁxed distribution of migration incentives
As a ﬁnal experiment, we estimate the model with autocorrelated income, but use the
unconditional distribution of migration incentives to evaluate migration rates. This esti-
mation therefore ignores dynamic self-selection, but leaves the parameters of the problem
unchanged otherwise. For example, from the micro perspective, the decision problem is
still dynamic and, naive net-present values of location choices remain unaltered.
Though this model is inconsistent, one could be persuaded by the logic that mi-
gration rates are small each year, making it innocent to approximate the conditional
incentive distribution (conditional on the place of residence) in (9) by the unconditional
distribution. Table 6 reports the estimation results. The parameter estimates from the
‘consistent’ model with dynamic self-selection are repeated for comparison.
Neglecting self-selection seems all but harmless. The point estimates of all model
parameters change substantially. Most importantly–and in line with our argument–the
estimated migration costs are with US$ 363,300 substantially larger. The bias in this last
experiment is largest since there is no oﬀsetting downwards bias from a misrepresentation
of the income process, i.e. of implied expected income streams.
Hence, treating migration as a dynamic decision problem at the micro level without
taking care of dynamic self-selection in the aggregation may lead to a more severe bias
than ignoring the dynamic structure of the migration decision altogether.
6.3 Implied micro characteristics & mover patterns
So far, we focused exclusively on the estimation of migration costs and the fact that
dynamic self-selection plays an important role for this estimation. However, current
contributions to the empirical study of migration behavior go beyond the representative
agent assumption of our homogeneous migration cost model (with heterogeneous incen-
tives). They argue on the basis that individual migration behavior displays a signiﬁcant
autocorrelation that there should be a mover-stayer dichotomy in the population. Some
agents would then have permanently lower migration costs than others due to some
deeper psychological factors.
However, inferring serially correlated migration costs from the observation of serially
correlated migration behavior may be hasty. High serial correlation of migration incen-
tives, implies on the one hand that those agents which have a strong incentive to remain
in state j in period t most likely keep this strong incentive also in period t +1 . On the
other hand, it also implies that those agents which have recently migrated can only be
mildly in favor of their new place of residence, otherwise they had moved earlier–at
least if migration costs are not too large. These considerations as a whole suggest that
28Table 6: Simulated moments estimation: Model ignoring dynamic self selection
Ignoring Dyn. With Dynamic
Parameter Self-Selection Self-Selection
Migration Costs 363,3001 18,2851
(9750) (2,211)
Correlation of Income Shocks 0.40524 0.2482
Across Regions Ψ (0.0367) (0.1947)
Fraction of Income Shock 0.014 0.0041
due to Aggregate Fluctuations φ (0.0015) (0.0011)
Standard Deviation of 0.0000 0.0266
Transitory Income Shock σϕ (0.0891) (0.0012)
p-value, χ2 (2) overident. test 0.0000 0.1865
1Migration cost estimate ˆ c in US$ terms.
Standard errors in parenthesis. Estimation is carried out using the simulated moments
estimator by Gourieroux, Monfort, and Renault (1993), which chooses structural model
parameters by matching the moments from a simulated panel of regions. See Table 1 for
further details. The simulations generate a panel of 51 region-pairs and a 81-year history of
migration and income data. The ﬁrst 55 years of simulated data are dropped in order to
minimize the inﬂuence of initial values. Each simulation is repeated 5 times and data moments
are compared to the average over the 5 replications of the simulation.
29Table 7: Comparison of Dynamic incentives model and Binomial model of migration:
Mover-Stayer Heterogeneity
Migration Stayers Single 2 or More 3 or More
Characteristics Movers Moves Moves
Dynamic Model (D) as % of population 47.7% 32.8% 19.5% 5.1%
as % of movers 62.7% 37.3% 9.8%
Binomial Model (B) as % of population 44.5% 36.7% 18.7% 4.3%
as % of movers 66.2% 33.8% 7.8%
D relative to B as % of population 1.078 0.894 1.043 1.186
as % of movers 0.946 1.105 1.256
Frequencies of migration behavior over a 20 period interval. The frequencies are obtained by
simulating the behavior of a cross-section of 50000 households for 70 years, using the migration
behavior of the households over the time interval [t +1 ,t+ 20], 20 <t≤ 50. Reported
frequencies are obtained by averaging over all overlapping subintervals and 5 repeated
simulations.
our model should be able to reproduce at least some "mover-stayer heterogeneity" in
migration data, even though agents are homogeneous with respect to their (psychic)
costs of migration.
Table 7 provides evidence on this. We simulate a sample of 50000 households over 70
years and track their migration behavior. We calculate migration probabilities over the
[t+1,t+20]year interval for those who migrated in year t and those who did not move
in year t, for 20 <t≤ 50. We compare the migration probabilities from our model to
the migration probabilities generated from a binomial model of migration that assumes
a constant migration probability equal to the average migration rate in the sample.16
Table 7 displays the probability of a household to never migrate ("Stayer"), migrate
exactly once ("Single mover"), migrate at least twice, and migrate at least three times
over the 20 year period. As one can see, substantially more households than predicted by
16A sas i d er e s u l to ft h i se x p e r i m e n t ,w es e et h a ta verage migration rates (when starting with the
ergodic distribution of potential income) reach their normal levels quickly, after about 3 periods. Conse-
quently, we can expect our results to carry over to a ﬁnite time framework as well, which is technically
much more diﬃcult to analyze though, since income distributions for each age group of agents would
need to be simulated.
30the binomial model do not move. At the other extreme, more households than predicted
by the binomial model move more than two or three times. Observing only the data in
Table 7, one might conjecture that our model exhibits a "mover-stayer heterogeneity",
which is not the case though. Yet, compared to the micro evidence provided for example
by Kennan and Walker (2006), our model–and hence dynamic self-selection–is unlikely
to explain all of the mover-stayer heterogeneity documented.
7C o n c l u s i o n
We have provided a tractable model of aggregate migration with a sound microeconomic
foundation. The paper is a contribution to the recently evolving literature on structural
models of migration. We explicitly deal with the problem that potential gains from
migration are unobservable and display a dynamic character. This dynamic character of
migration incentives has two aspects: First, the individual gains from migration evolve
stochastically over time, but will typically be highly persistent. Second, at an aggregate
level, the distribution of migration incentives is a result of past migration decisions
themselves.
Starting from the microeconomic decision problem allows us to keep track of the dy-
namics of the incentive distribution. This dynamics is driven by (dynamic) self-selection.
Neglecting this self-selection results in biased estimates of structural parameters, such
as migration costs. In our application to US interstate migration, we estimate migration
costs to be substantially lower than those reported in previous studies. The estimated
migration costs amount to about US$ 18,500, which corresponds to less than one-half of
an average annual income.
Our analysis calls for a careful treatment of the self-selection problem when economic
incentives are not fully observable. What makes this issue particularly relevant for the
analysis of migration is that unobservable incentives are highly autocorrelated though not
perfectly persistent. Rather than being drawn every period anew, migration incentives
have a long memory. One example of this long memory of migration incentives is the
persistency that income displays. We integrated the persistency of unobserved migration
incentives in a structural dynamic microeconomic model of the migration decision. This
consequently allowed us to simulate the joint behavior of the observed migration rates,
of the unobserved migration incentives, and of their observable proxies, i.e. incomes.
Addressing the partial unobservability of migration incentives may not only be im-
portant to macro-studies of migration. Even at a micro level, potential incomes are
typically unobservable and have to be proxied. However, such approximation regularly
neglects self-selection. If households live in their preferred place of residence as a result
31of their location choice, and if all observable things are equal, then it must be the unob-
served component of their preferences that is in favor of the place where they actually
live in. Besides unobservable parts of income, this unobservable component of prefer-
ences can also comprise diﬀerent valuations of diﬀerent amenities and social networks.
Even these factors can be expected to exhibit persistency.
Future research calls for a more complex microeconomic model that integrates more
information into the macroeconomic analysis, for example labor market conditions and
amenities. Additionally, it would be desirable to extend our bi-regional approach to
the case of multiple regions, as in Davies, Greenwood and Li (2001), and Kennan and
Walker (2006). Further aspects, such as the interaction of migration and local labor
markets, could be analyzed in a general equilibrium framework as in Coen-Pirani (2006),
but our results call for an explicit treatment of the dynamic structure and persistency
of migration incentives. However, all this goes beyond what is currently numerically
feasible, in particular if the model is meant to be estimated. Beyond the application
to migration decisions, our treatment of the dynamic self-selection problem may also be
applicable to other important discrete choices in an economy, for example labor-market
participation or product switching.
328 Appendix
8.1 Existence and uniqueness of the value function
We begin with proving existence and uniqueness of the value function. Notation is as in
the main text throughout this appendix, unless stated otherwise.
For the ease of exposition, we assume that the income process is only approximately
log-normal. In particular, we assume that income has a ﬁnite support.




be the support of w.
Deﬁnition 2 Deﬁne a mapping T according to the migration problem of a household,
that is
T (u)(k,wiAt,w iBt)= m a x
j=A,B
©
exp(wijt) − I{k6=j}c + βEtu(j,wiAt+1,w iBt+1)
ª
. (13)
The mapping T is deﬁned on the set of all real-valued, bounded functions B that are
continuous with respect to wA,B and have domain D = {A,B}×W2.
Lemma 3 The mapping T preserves boundedness.
Proof. To show that T preserves boundedness one has to show that for any bounded
function u also Tu is bounded. Consider u to be bounded from above by ¯ u and bounded





















exp(wijt) − I{k6=j}c + βu
ª
≥ exp(W)+βu > −∞. (16)
Lemma 4 The mapping T preserves continuity.
Proof. Since Tu is the maximum of two continuous functions, it is itself continuous.
Lemma 5 The mapping T satisﬁes Blackwell’s conditions.
Proof. First, we need to show that for any u1 (·) <u 2 (·) the mapping T preserves
the inequality. Since both the expectations operator and the max operator preserve the
33inequality, also T does so. Second, we need to show that T (u + a) ≤ Tu+ γa for any
constant a and some γ<1. Straightforward algebra shows that
T (u + a)=Tu+ βa. (17)
Since β<1 by assumption, T satisﬁes Blackwell’s conditions.
Proposition 6 The mapping T has a unique ﬁxed point on B, and hence the Bellman-
equation has a unique solution.
Proof. Follows straightforwardly from the last three Lemmas.
8.2 Eﬀect of Income Shocks on the Distribution of Income
Idiosyncratic shocks, aggregate shocks, and the persistency of the income process de-
termine the transition of the distribution of income incentives after migration to the
distribution of migration incentives before migration in the next period. The income
distribution at the beginning of period t+1, Ft+1, results from adding idiosyncratic and
aggregate shocks to the distribution of income after migration in period t, ˆ Ft, of which
ˆ fjt(wA,w B) is the conditional density, see (11). This means that a household having
an income wijt+1 in period t +1can result from any possible combination of wijt and
ξijt+1 = θjt+1 + ωijt+1 for which
wijt+1 = μj (1 − ρ)+ρwijt + θjt+1 + ωijt+1 (18)
holds. Solving this equation for wijt, we obtain
w∗
j (wijt+1,θjt+1,ωijt+1): =wijt =







j (wijt+1,θjt+1,ωijt+1) is the time-t potential income in region j that is consistent
with a future potential income of wijt+1 and realizations of shocks θjt+1 + ωijt+1 at
the beginning of period t +1 . Now suppose that both kinds of shocks, θ and ω, have
been realized. Then, w∗
A,B is a one-to-one mapping of future incomes (wiAt+1,w iBt+1)
to current income (wiAt,w iBt).
The conditional density of observing the future income pair (wiAt+1,w iBt+1) can thus
be obtained from a retrospective. The income pair (w∗
A,w∗
B) of past incomes corresponds
uniquely to a future income pair (wiAt+1,w iBt+1). Consequently, we can express the
density of the income distribution at time t +1using the income distribution after
34migration ˆ Ft, and its conditional density ˆ fjt. T h ed e n s i t yo ft h ei n c o m ed i s t r i b u t i o n





Weighting this density with the density of the idiosyncratic shocks h(ωiAt+1,ωiBt+1)
yields the density of observing the future income pair (w∗
A,w∗




B (wB,θBt+1,ωiBt+1)) · h(ωiAt+1,ωiBt+1).
Integrating over all possible idiosyncratic shocks (ωiAt+1,ωiBt+1) yields the density
fjt+1 of the income distribution before migration in period t+1for a certain combination





B (wB,θBt+1,ωB)) · h(ωA,ωB)dωAdωB,j= A,B. (21)
For given aggregate shocks, this new distribution determines migration from region j to
region −j a c c o r d i n gt oe q u a t i o n(9) for period t +1 .
The evolution of income distributions can thus be summarized as follows. Between
two consecutive periods, the conditional distribution of potential incomes ﬁrst evolves
as a result of migration decisions, moving the density from fjt to ˆ fjt. Thereafter, the
distribution is again altered by aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks to income, moving
the density from ˆ fjt to fjt+1. The latter density now determines migration decisions in
period t +1 , starting the cycle over again. In other words, migration incentives are not
only a result of past income shocks, but also a result of past migration decisions.
8.3 Invariant distribution
We prove that migration decisions and idiosyncratic shocks to income imply that poten-
tial income follows an ergodic Markov-process if there are no aggregate shocks. There-
fore, there is an invariant distribution the sequence of income distributions converges
to. For simplicity, we present the proof for an arbitrary discrete approximation of the
model with a continuous state-space for income.
Lemma 7 Assume an arbitrary discretization of the state space with n points for the
35potential income in each of the regions. Then, we can capture the transition from ft to
ft+1, which are the unconditional densities of the distribution of households over both
regions and potential incomes, in a matrix Γ =
Ã
Π(I − DA) ΠDB




In this matrix, Π denotes the transition matrix that approximates the AR(1)-process for
income by a Markov-chain, see Adda and Cooper (2003, pp. 56) for details. Matrix Dj,
j = A,B is the n2 × n2 diagonal matrix with the migration hazard rates for each of the
n2 income pairs of the income grid.
Proof. First, we take a discrete state-space of n possible incomes for each region,
wA1...wAn and wB1...wBn. Second, we denote the vector of probabilities that describes
the distribution of potential incomes and household locations in the following form
f =
³




Analogously, we deﬁne the distribution after migration but before idiosyncratic shocks,







Now, deﬁne dh ∈ {0,1} as the fraction of households that migrate and are in the h-th
income and location triple given our vectorization of the income grid. This means that
dh = Λj (wAk,w Bl),h=1 ...2n2, where (j,wAk,w Bl) i st h eh - t he l e m e n ti nt h ev e c t o r i z e d
grid. Moreover, deﬁne D = diag (d) as the diagonal matrix with migration rates on the
diagonal and DA and DB as the diagonal matrices with only the ﬁrst n2 and the last n2
elements of d, respectively. Then, we can describe the transition from ft to ˆ ft by
ˆ ft =
Ã
I − DA DB
DA I − DB
!
ft (24)
Combining the last two equations, we obtain
ft+1 =
Ã
Π(I − DA) ΠDB
ΠDA Π(I − DB)
!
ft. (25)
17Since we work with a discretization, strictly speaking f is not a density, but a vector of probabilities
for drawing a location-income possibility vector from a given element of the grid.
36Lemma 8 For any distribution of idiosyncratic shocks with support equal to W2, matrix
Π has only strictly positive entries.
Proof. If the idiosyncratic shocks have support equal to W2, then every pair of potential
incomes can be reached from every other pair of incomes as a result of the shock, because
we assume the shocks to income to be approximately log-normal. Thus, all entries of Π
are strictly positive.
Lemma 9 Γ2 has only positive entries.











, without loss of generality, where Iz is a z×z unit






















where A1 ∈ R(n2−na)×(n2−na),B 1 ∈ Rnb×nb,C 1 ∈ Rna×na,D 1 ∈ R(n2−nb)×(n2−nb).
This yields for Γ2 after some tedious algebra
Γ2 =
⎛
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
B2C3 A2A4 B2C4 A2B4
B4C3 A4A4 B4C4 A4B4
D1C1 C1A2 D1D1 C1B2
D3C1 C3A2 D3D1 C3B2
⎞
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
.
Each entry of this matrix is positive, since Π and hence its partitions are positive.
Proposition 10 Under the assumptions of the above Lemmas, migration and idiosyn-
cratic shocks deﬁne an ergodic process with a stationary distribution F0 =l i m n→∞ Bnei.
Proof. The above Lemma directly implies the ergodicity of the Markov chain.
8.4 Data
Data on migration between US federal states is provided by the US Internal Revenue
Service (IRS). The IRS uses individual income tax returns to calculate internal migration
ﬂows between US states. In particular, the IRS compiles migration data by matching
37Table 8: Descriptive statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Migration Rate .0393 .0178 .0144 .1146
Migration Rate Filtered .0393 .0036 .0234 .0629
Income per Capita 10.71 .1644 10.39 11.27
Income per Capita Filtered 10.71 .0312 10.61 10.82
Complementary Income per Capita 10.76 .0624 10.67 10.86
Complementary Income per Capita Filtered 10.76 .0239 10.73 10.80
the Social Security number of the primary taxpayer from one year to the next. The IRS
identiﬁes households with an address change since the previous year, and then totals
migration to and from each state in the US to every other state. Given these bilateral
migration ﬂows, we compute aggregate gross immigration for the 50 US states and the
District of Columbia as the sum of all immigrations from other US states to a particular
state. Migration rates are calculated by expressing gross immigration as proportions
of the number of non-migrants reported in the IRS dataset. The IRS state-to-state
migration-ﬂow data is available for the years 1989 - 2004.
Income per capita data is taken from the Regional Economic Information System
(REIS) compiled by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). We personal income as the
relevant income concept. The REIS data is available online at www.bea.gov/bea/regional/reis/.
The income-per-capita ﬁgure for the alternative region is computed as the population-
weighted mean of all per capita incomes outside a speciﬁc state.
We remove a linear time trend from all data and express all variables as deviations
from their unit-speciﬁc means (re-scaled by their overall mean), i.e. we apply a within-
transformation. Table 8 reports descriptive statistics for the original as well as for the
transformed data.
In order to examine the time-series properties of the data employed, we perform a
38unit-root analysis for migration rates and income data. In a sample of size T =1 6and
N =5 1either a Breitung and Meyer (1994) or a Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002) unit-root
test is most appropriate. For the Breitung and Meyer (1994) test, we determined the
optimal augmentation lag length by sequential t−testing. Taking into account three
augmentation lags and time-speciﬁce ﬀects, we can reject the null hypothesis of a unit
root at the 5% level of signiﬁcance. Similarly, the Levin, Lin, and Chu (2003) test rejects
the null hypothesis of a unit root taking a linear time trend into account.
8.5 Numerical aspects
The ﬁrst step in solving the model numerically is to obtain a solution to (6). We do so
by value-function iteration.18 For this value-function iteration, we ﬁrst approximate the
bivariate process of potential incomes for an individual agent in regions A and B
wijt = μj (1 − ρ)+ρwijt−1 + ξijt (26)
by a Markov chain. Because wA and wB are correlated through the correlation structure






of (wA,w B) in the
value function iteration.
We evaluate the value function on an equi-spaced grid for the orthogonal components
with a width of ±3.5σ+
A,B around their means, where σ+
A,B denote the long-run standard
deviations of the orthogonal components. The grid is chosen to capture almost all move-
ments of the income distribution F later on.19 Given this grid, we use Tauchen’s (1986)
algorithm to obtain the transition probabilities for the Markov-chain approximation of
the income process in (26).
We apply a multigrid algorithm (see Chow and Tsitsiklis, 1991) to speed up the
calculation of the value function. This algorithm works iteratively. It ﬁrst solves the
dynamic programming problem for a coarse grid and then doubles the number of grid
points in each iteration until the grid is ﬁne enough. In between iterations the solution
for the coarser grid is used to generate the initial guess for the value-function iteration
on the new grid by spline interpolation. The initial grid has 16×16 points (income A ×
income B) and the ﬁnal grid has 128×128 points.
18See for example Adda and Cooper (2003) for an overview of dynamic programming techniques.
19The choice of ±3.5σ
+
A,B is motivated as follows. We obtain in the estimation that about 99%
of the income shocks is due to the idiosyncratic component. Therefore, we can expect 99.9% of the




A,B ∼ = ±3.27σ
+
A,B around the mean of the





A,B ∼ = ±0.33σ
+
A,B in again 99.9% of all years. Since the sum of both components is
±3.6σ
+
A,B, a grid variation of ±3.5σ
+
A,B should not truncate the income distribution.
39The solution of (6) yields the optimal migration policy and thus the microeconomic
migration hazard rates Λj. With these hazard rates, we can obtain a series of aggregate
migration rates for a simulated economy as described in detail in Section 4.2 for any
realization of aggregate shocks (θjt)
j=A,B
t=1...T and an initial distribution F0.
This means that we need an initial distribution of income F0 to solve the sequential
problem. Following Caballero and Engel’s (1999) suggestion, we use the ergodic distrib-
ution of income ¯ F that would be obtained in the absence of aggregate income shocks.20
This ergodic distribution ¯ F is a natural starting guess for F0 as Caballero and Engel
(1999) argue.
















weight φ measures the relative importance of aggregate shocks, relative to idiosyncratic
shocks, i.e. σ2
ω =( 1− φ)σ2
ξ and σ2
θ = φσ2
ξ. Correspondingly, the orthogonal components






As we did to approximate the microeconomic income process for value function iter-
ation, we also discretize the distribution of migration incentives over the chosen grid of
income to simulate its evolution. Accordingly, we replace the conditional density in (9)
by discrete probabilities. This means that for grid points ¯ xjk,j= A,B; k =1 ...64, (k
being the index of grid points) with a distance of 2h in between points, we calculate the







An aggregate shock θj now implies that the oﬀ-grid pair (¯ xA,k + θA, ¯ xB,k + θB) oc-
curs with probability ¯ pk,0. To re-obtain on-grid probabilities, we use spline interpolation
methods to ﬁnd pk,1, restricting p to take values between 0 and 1. That is, for each t we
deﬁne a function z with z (¯ xA,k + θA,t+1, ¯ xB,k + θB,t+1): =¯ pk,t and obtain ¯ pk,t+1as
¯ pk,t+1 =ˆ z (¯ xA,k, ¯ xB,k)
where ˆ z is the interpolation of z. Idiosyncratic shocks are accounted for by multiplying
after-aggregate-shock, on-grid income probabilities with the transition probability ma-
trix obtained from Tauchen’s algorithm. The eﬀect of migration on the distribution of
20This distribution is calculated by assuming that idiosyncratic shocks ω have the full variance of ξ.
40migration incentives is captured by using a discretized version of (11).
We calculate aggregate migration rates this way, i.e. by directly simulating the
evolution of the incentive distribution instead of using a Monte Carlo method based on
drawing a sample of agents, for the reason that the latter is not adequate in our case.
We focus on aggregate behavior, but aggregate shocks turn out to be relatively small
(being responsible for less than 1% of the total variation in income, see the discussion
in Section 5.2). Hence sampling variation would exceed the true aggregate variation of
income most likely if we applied a Monte Carlo approximation.
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